

CLOUD DEFENSE:

AWS Common Findings & Mitigating Controls



Discuss common pitfalls of the AWS cloud architecture



Shed light on practical pentest findings



Display remediation methods for findings



Rinse and Repeat

Overview

Region – A separate geographic location

Availability zones – Isolated locations within a region

VPC – Virtual Private Cloud (Virtual Network)

Security Groups – Instance level Security

AMI - Amazon Machine Images

S3 – Simple Storage Service

IAM – Identity Access Management

ENI – Elastic network interface

AWS Terms

Think adaptive and elastic

Treat servers as disposable resources

Automate

Implement loose coupling

Focus of services, not servers

Database is the base of it all

Remove single points of failure

Optimize for cost

Cache

Cloud Architecture Security

AWS Cloud architecture



Utilize AWS features for Defense



Shared security responsibility model



Reduce privileged access



Create AWS scripts



Testing and Auditing

AWS Cloud Security

- Prioritizing a Security Strategy Ahead of Controls and Tools
- Overcoming the Lack of Security Visibility in the Cloud
- Improving Confidence in Cloud Provider Security
- Defining Who is Liable
 - Understanding Why Attackers are Attracted to the Cloud
- Defending Against Curious Onlookers in Multi-Tenant Infrastructures
 - Addressing Compliance Regulations From the Get-Go

Avoiding AWS Security Pitfalls





AWS metadata endpoint

S3 Buckets





Credential management

Route 53 domain takeovers

Pentest findings common in AWS

SSRF & AWS Metadata - Capital One -



Insider threat



Capital one was subjected to this type of attack in conjunction with an SSRF (Server Side Request Forgery)



Once the SSRF was completed the AWS metadata endpoint could be compromised.



AWS metadata endpoint is in every AWS environment and has information to help authenticate

SSRF Example

hack-box-01 \$ curl http://web-server.com:4567/\?url\=http://10.0.0.2/

RESPONSE: httml> admin panel</title></head>...</html>

AWS Metadata Information

ami-id ami-launch-index ami-manifest-path block-device-mapping/ events/ hostname iam/ instance-action instance-id instance-type local-hostname local-ipv4 mac metrics/ network/ placement/ profile public-hostname public-ipv4 public-keys/ reservation-id security-groups services/

Lessons Learned

AWS metadata is needed but should be secured from access from SSRF's using host based firewalls, whitelisting, and GPOs (Not just Security Groups)

SSRF's should be tested for on all external facing applications and corrected once found.



"Dangling" CName entries



Happens when using AWS DNS servers



Associated name servers do not have zone files



E.g. Deleted or Removed zones without removing a pointer at the domain registrar.

Route 53 Zone Takeovers

Remove nameserver entries corresponding to the deleted zone in AWS from the domain registrar

AWS zones should be monitored for removal activities and trigger alerts or remediation actions

Remediation of Zone Takeovers

Credential Management

Use of hard-coded passwords

Plaintext storage of passwords

J2EE Misconfiguration

Hard-coded credentials

Insufficientally protected credentials

Remediation









NEVER STORE SENSITIVE INFORMATION IN EASILY ACCESSIBLE FORMATS OR LOCATIONS



ALWAYS USE ENCRYPTION WHEN DEALING WITH CREDENTIALS



LIMIT PERMISSIONS OF CREDENTIALS TO ONLY WHAT IS NEEDED.



Publicly accessible buckets with information stored that should not be



Uses common names that are easily guessable



No use of access controls or permissions



Data not encrypted



No visibility into access

Mismanaged S3 Buckets



Public buckets should always have permissions and restrictions associated with



No sensitive information should be stored on a bucket that is not controlled



Buckets should be monitored for activity



IAM roles should be applied on a per bucket or buckets basis that restricts information



Encryption should always be considered for the information inside a bucket.

Remediation

THANK YOU!

Questions?